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THE SOVIET MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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
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# STUDENT ESSAY

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## THE SOVIET MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND ARMS CONTROL TALKS

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM P. SCHNEIDER  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS

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ABSTRACT:

AUTHOR: William P. Schneider, Colonel, CE

TITLE: The Soviet (Military Industrial Complex (MIC) and  
Arms Control Talks

FORMAT: Essay

The best hope for peace is successful negotiations for arms control with the Soviets. These have been less than successful because Americans and Soviets do not understand one another's language. The Soviet system produces a negotiator who has a peculiar understanding of the United States and its negotiators. This peculiar understanding is based on the completely different structure of his society and understanding of the US MIC. The Soviet Union is a MIC; it is controlled like a military organization and favors the military and military production at the expense of all other sectors of the economy. The Soviet and US MICs were examined from the point of view of the inhabitant of the USSR and an attempt was made to show the 'bias' of the Soviet negotiator as a result of his being reared as an integral part of a MIC. The author shows that an attempt must be made to understand the Soviet negotiators on their own terms rather than in terms of US society.

## THE SOVIET MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND ARMS CONTROL TALKS

The Soviet Union has in recent years usurped the position of the world's leading proponent of disarmament while building the world's most formidable war machine. The United States, on the other hand, seeks and has consistently sought to limit the arms race, principally by bilateral negotiation with the Soviet Union. Two factors limit our success in this field: failure to understand the Soviets at the conference table, and the feeling on the part of the US Legislature and public that the US will inevitably lose at the bargaining table. There is some basis in fact for the latter feeling; the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements often have been used as examples of our incompetence,<sup>1</sup> while deception and treachery are bywords for Soviet negotiators. Our failure to understand the Soviets results from the fact that they have been brought up on an entirely different philosophical basis and have entirely different referents on which to base their views and expressions of them. The Soviets base their conception of the US on their own system and a Marxist-Leninist approach to the American way of life, and more particularly on the premise that our economic system is dominated by a military industrial complex (MIC). The MIC must have an arms race and seeks war as a means of generating profits. Many people

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<sup>1</sup>Foy D. Kohler, Understanding the Russian, (1970), p. 77 & 308.

in our country have similar misgivings.<sup>2</sup> This paper seeks to describe the peculiarly Soviet aspects of the Soviet MIC in terms that are readily understandable, and suggests some more constructive ways of thinking about their system for the professional military officer who serves as an arms limitation or control negotiator.

#### THE USSR AND THE SOVIET MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (MIC)

The picture which the Soviet Union paints of itself is one of a peace loving nation seeking total disarmament, inherently uninterested in creating a war machine but forced to do so by circumstances. Some studies recently have addressed the subject of the Soviet MIC without, however, addressing the question of what the members of this complex might be expected to think about disarmament or detente and how they might be expected to conduct negotiations on such subject.<sup>3,4</sup> There is very little information in the unclassified literature on Soviet stances in such talks but their

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<sup>2</sup>The most famous was President Eisenhower who put it this way: "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." Text of Eisenhower Farewell Address, New York Times, Jan 18, 1961, p 22.

<sup>3</sup>Richard Armstrong, "Military Industrial Complex--Russian Style", Fortune, Aug 1, 1969, pp 85-126.

<sup>4</sup>William T. Lee, "Soviet Military Industrial Complex", Armed Forces Management, May & Jun 70; Part I, May 70, pp 25-35, Part II, Jun 70, pp 40-43. This article includes an excellent analysis of the Soviet R&D system to include the relative expenditures of the USSR and the US.



position can be predicted from their public statements and a knowledge of their culture and background.

Any discussion of the Soviet MIC should start with the truism that the entire Soviet Union is a MIC; a society in which defense needs are paramount and the entire population is kept at a poverty level (by US standards) in order to keep the military abundantly supplied with the latest in hardware. It is difficult for an American in an atmosphere of free press, competition, and individual rights to conceive of a system which can keep an entire nation in bondage to a special interest group. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union does just that in controlling the world's largest MIC.<sup>5</sup>

Control is exercised through a dual party-government system. The party, however, is not a political party as Americans understand political parties; it is not a group of people of like ideals who have banded together to seek popular support and increased membership. Instead, it is an elite group selected by the incumbents on a basis of proven zeal for the Communist cause. It does not seek to widen indefinitely the base of popular support by increased party membership nor does it attempt to reach a consensus by changing the party position

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<sup>5</sup>Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1964) p 246. This book remains the definitive study of the exercise of power in the Soviet Union.

to accommodate the majority or bow to "public pressure".<sup>6</sup> The Party position is determined by the Politburo as it interprets Marx and Lenin for the good of the proletariat; the position is communicated to the public by the media (all controlled directly by the Party) which then generate the necessary "pressure". A simplified diagram of the Communist Party Central Committee is shown in figure 1.<sup>7</sup>

The Soviet Government is organized with ministries nominally subordinate to a supreme Soviet but actually run by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and its Presidium, and each of the republics is similarly organized (Figure 2).<sup>8</sup> The government is not organized to determine policy but to execute it, policy is determined by the Communist Party through the Central Committee of the Communist Party<sup>9</sup> which in turn takes its orders from the Politburo, a group of twenty-one members of the Central Committee, Fig 3!<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p 282

<sup>7</sup> US Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-6, USSR Strategic Survey (19-) inclosed chart.

<sup>8</sup> Politicheskaya Organizatsiya Sovyetskovo Obschestva, Politizdat, Moscow (1968), p 23. (Political Organization of Soviet Society)

<sup>9</sup> "The Central Committee of the CPSU directs and coordinates the activity of all states and social organs in strengthening the defense capability of the country, organizes control for the fulfillment of decisions on military matters, determines the ruling positions in the realm of Soviet science and military." A. Ye Khmel, Party Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1968, p 6.

<sup>10</sup> US Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-95, Area Handbook for the Soviet Union (1971), hereafter referred to as DA Pam 500-95.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION





Figure 1. The Communist Party Central Committee

# USSR GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE



\* Includes all Defense Industries  
 \*\* Includes Civil Aviation, Internal Affairs & Railways, all of which have defense roles  
 + Includes Ministry of Defense

Figure 2. The Soviet Government

# POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

## MEMBERS

L.I. Brezhnev (Gen Sec, Central Comm., Member, Presidium USSR Supreme Soviet)  
 G.I. Voronov (Chm., RSFSR Council of Ministers)  
 A.P. Kirilenko (Secretary Central Committee)  
 A.N. Kosygin (Chairman USSR Council of Ministers)  
 K.T. Mazurov (1st Dep. Chm. USSR Council of Ministers)  
 A.Ya. Pelshe (Chm. Central Comm. Party Control Comm.)  
 N.V. Podgorniy (Chm. Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet)  
 D.S. Polyanskiy (1st Dep. Chm. USSR Council of Ministers)  
 M.A. Suslov (Sec. Central Committee)  
 A.N. Shelepin (Chm., All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions)  
 P.Ye. Shelest (1st Sec Central Committee Ukrainian Comm. Party)

## CANDIDATE MEMBERS

Yu. V. Andropov (Chm., KGB)  
 V.V. Grishin (1st Sec., Moscow City Party Comm)  
 P. N. Demichev (Sec., Central Comm.)  
 D.A. Kunayev (1st Sec., Cent. Comm. Kazakh Comm Party)  
 P.M. Masherov (1st Sec Byelorussian Cent. Comm)  
 V.P. Mzhavanadze (1st Sec. Georgian Cent Comm)  
 Sh.R. Rashidov (1st Sec Uzbek Central Comm)  
 D. F. Ustinov (Sec., Central Committee)  
 V.V. Shcherbitskiy (Chm. Ukrainian Council of Ministers)

## SECRETARIAT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

GENERAL SECRETARY	<u>Leonid I. Brezhnev</u>	P.D. Kulakov*
	<u>P.N. Demichev</u>	B.N. Ponomarev*
Also on Politburo	I.V. Kapitonov*	M.S. Solomentsev*
* Also head of Central Committee Section	K.P. Katushev	<u>M.A. Suslov</u>
	<u>A.P. Kirilenko</u>	<u>D.F. Ustinov</u>

Figure 3. Central Committee Control Apparatus

It is important to note that Marshal Grechko, the Minister of Defense, and eight of his eleven Deputy Ministers of Defense are members of the Central Committee. Defense is the only ministry among the more than fifty ministries with such a high number of members. Strategy and doctrine and hence weapon buys and the shape of the economy in general is formulated by the senior Party/Central Committee members.<sup>11</sup>

The Politburo, since its inception, has been dominated by one, two, or three men, who are all-powerful and have maintained their position by skillfully blended use of persuasion, threat and terror. These men have exercised control by virtue of their position, first of all in the Party and then in the Government. Directives go down both chains of command at the same time and woe be unto him who fails to fulfill the directive for any reason. The party member of the cell at the shop, shift or office level insures that party policies and directives are carried out by informing his superior Party organization of the incipient or actual failure and the senior organization takes whatever disciplinary measures are necessary. Since in every case the party organization is senior to the government organization there is no question of who will

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<sup>11</sup> Harriet Scott. Soviet Military Doctrine; Its Formulation, Content and Spokesman, 1970

win. The dual feedback up and down the chain of command historically had the effect one might have expected - it acts as a brake to initiative and progress and keeps outside stimuli from having any appreciable effect.<sup>12</sup>

#### CONTROL OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Let us consider the Party control system as it works in the defense sector. In the Politburo and in the Party secretariat sits Dmitri Fyodorovich Ustinov, the czar of an empire greater than the Romanovs ever dreamed of. Ustinov, like many of the other members of the Politburo, has a partly military background, a graduate of the Leningrad Institute of Military Technology, he was appointed by Stalin as Commissar of Armaments at age 33.<sup>13</sup> He was largely responsible for the successful sustaining of production as the Germans overran the principal production centers of the country. In spite of many snarls, almost the entire industry was moved beyond the Ural Mountains or was started there from very modest beginnings. The Soviet Union, nevertheless, produced more than 100,000 tanks, 120,000 aircraft of all types, and 660,000 artillery pieces and mortars from 1941 to 1945 while fighting a war that destroyed almost the entire prewar production

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<sup>12</sup> NA Pam 550-95, p 423,581. A case in point is the recent attempt to introduce incentives as an aid to control of production.

<sup>13</sup> Armstrong, p. 122.

capacity.<sup>14</sup> Most of the industry that was moved beyond the Urals was left in place as the stripped areas were restored. Instead German labor, equipment and know-how was used to build new industrial capacity where the old had been; many plants were lifted from their German foundations and moved to new locations in the USSR.<sup>15</sup>

Ustinov continues to demonstrate the same drive and success; his efforts resulted in Soviet developed nuclear weapons in only two years of intensive work, and shortly thereafter in hydrogen weapons. He also can take credit for most of the Soviet missile program which is second to none in terms of megatons carried or tonnage lifted by a single military rocket. Because he is a member of the Politburo and also the Party Secretariat, Ustinov not only sets policy, he is also largely responsible for carrying it out. He gives orders directly to the Ministers of the defense related industries, all of whom are also Members or Candidate Members of the Central Committee.<sup>16</sup>

A fundamental control feature of the Soviet economy that distinguishes it from that of the US is the Plan. The

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<sup>14</sup>Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-45, (1964), p 576

<sup>15</sup>East Germany was bled dry of industrial equipment, first called reparations and then simply not mentioned, even the trains carrying the loot made the trip one-way.

<sup>16</sup>These are: Defense, Aviation, Automobile, General Machine Building, Medium Machine Building, Machine Building, Radio, Shipbuilding, and Electronics, DA Pam 550-6.



Ministers set the policy for the Plan within and between Ministries and oversee its execution on a yearly and 5-yearly basis. In the case of the defense industry sector, the Politburo takes a direct interest in the allocation of norms or quotas to the various industries. In turn the Politburo, operating through Party channels, insures that the necessary priorities for manpower and raw materials are furnished to the defense sector. The number of weapons required is determined by the military planners who then come to an agreement with the Politburo. Although there is a great amount of unanimity in the determining of military production goals because of the interrelationship of the Party and the military, there inevitably arise occasions when the professional military officers disagree with some of the other members of the Central Committee on priorities. The military members then try to persuade the Politburo that their needs are real and they can count on some support from those members who rely on the military for support to obtain their way. Khrushchev, who believed general non-nuclear war was irrational was able to go counter to the military's desire for increased conventional weapons for several years before it succeeded in finding someone who could oust him. In the long term, however, consumer goods have had lowest priority; and there is little to indicate any change to improve the relative

supply of consumer products. "The proportion of industrial production that has gone into consumer goods has actually declined from approximately 60% in the mid 1920's to approximately 30% at the beginning of the 1970's."<sup>17</sup>

#### COMPONENT INDUSTRIAL UNITS

The plants themselves deserve a few moments study if one's understanding of a defense industry is based on the United States pattern. Soviet industries come in three basic types - those which produce only defense materials, those which have a defense production commitment for mobilization or which produce some such items but have another major product which they produce in peace time, and those which do not normally produce any military product. The purely defense type is centrally controlled in every category and is planned and directed from Moscow by the appropriate ministry in close coordination with the Ministry of Defense. Security is usually very strict even if the plant is in a city which is rarely if ever visited by foreigners: access is controlled by badge and a time clock check-in system, fences are multiple inside high concrete walls and one of the

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<sup>17</sup>DA Pam 550-95, Handbook, p. 601.

fences is probably electrified, and quality control is absolute. Priorities are high for receiving skilled laborers and prison laborers, but even so most defense plants are suffering from an acute labor shortage in the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup> Even a recently constructed factory in Chelyabinsk, producing critical solid state components suffers from the sloppy construction and indifferent attitudes of Soviet workmen. The air conditioned loft in the center of the main building has double story glass brick windows and fluorescent lighting and resembles a modern western factory building but the lack of paint and the unbelievably bad painting of the mortar gives it away. The nearby shipping dock looks like a slum and the older buildings built two or more years ago have bent pipes crawling over the roof like demented worms - all windows are barred, naturally. There is no plant name or trade mark visible anywhere; for shipping purposes the plant is known only by its designator "9178H". Only the billboard beside the main entrance gives any clue as to what the plant produces - the plant needs electronic technicians, radio specialist, refrigerator repairmen, drill and lathe operators

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<sup>18</sup> *ibid*, p. 639.

desperately. One section of the plant has been separated from the rest by its own barbed wire entanglement. This is "The First Circle" where prisoners work on high priority and classified projects.<sup>19</sup>

The intermediate type of plant which produces a large portion of the military equipment of the Soviet Union has a production line which is set aside to produce purely military subassemblies or produces some component needed for both military and civilian use. The Red Banner Shock Armature Plant named for M. A. Lavrentyev in Khabarovsk presents a dreary picture: built in 1954, it is a shambles from one end to the other: no paint anywhere, and sloppy workmanship everywhere. The small section set off by barbed wire where prisoners are building a new shop is the "spetstsekh", the shop that (in addition to plant security) performs quality control on military items only and where certain mobilization items are stored. Quality control on the military armatures is 100% while it almost does not exist anywhere else in the plant. Military guards for the prisoners and the Signal Corps troops who perform the quality control are billeted in the nearby barracks.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Personal observation by the author strongly substantiates the description given in Solzhenitsyn's books, and tends to refute the bright picture portrayed in DA Pam 550-95, pp 480-85.

<sup>20</sup>Personal observation by author. Factory names and locations have been changed for obvious reasons.

Because the military industrial plants are centrally controlled they are not troubled with many of the ills that make life difficult for the average plant manager in the Soviet Union - crippling shortages of workers, spare parts, etc. are rarely allowed to persist very long. It is very important that one should not underestimate the quality of the weapons which the shoddy system, described above, furnishes to the military component of the MIC. Some very accurate rifles were turned out by Afghan gunsmiths using lathes run by foot treadles. The same rocket that will put a robot vehicle on the surface of the moon will put a hydrogen bomb in the White House.

#### THE MILITARY COMPONENT

The military component of the MIC is undoubtedly the best known part of the entire Soviet Union and has been extensively treated elsewhere. I will mention only one feature of the system that is pertinent here - the position of the military in Soviet society.

Under Stalin the Communist Party clearly dominated any party-military struggles but with Stalin's death and the internecine strife which followed, the military under the leadership of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, was able to sharply improve its power position in the government.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Fainsod, pp. 481 ff.

With the advent of Brezhnev and Kosygin to power (more particularly Brezhnev) however, the Party has once more asserted its total dominance, without decreasing military expenditures.<sup>22</sup>

An indicator of the position of the military in the system is the relative emphasis placed on military and civilian goods in the economy, as exemplified by military expenditures. At a time when most people in the world have become aware that the US and USSR are in a struggle for supremacy in almost every field, but especially military, expenditures by the US for missiles and other national security items are decreasing both relatively and absolutely (if Vietnam expenditures are discounted). The Soviet Union on the other hand, continues to increase expenditures in absolute terms.<sup>23</sup>

The Soviet military R&D program has turned out a whole new family of strategic weapons including FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System) and MRV (Multiple Reentry Vehicle). We have reached the stage where the Chief of DDR&E, Dr. John Foster, was forced to admit to the Congress that the USSR was capable of surprising the US with weapons of a totally new nature,<sup>24</sup> just as the US in 1945 was able to astonish the world with the atomic bomb.

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<sup>22</sup>Thomas W. Wolfe, Evolution of Soviet Military Policy, (1968), p. 34 ff.

<sup>23</sup>Lee, Part II, pp 41-43.

<sup>24</sup>Dr. John S. Foster Jr., Testimony before House of Representatives Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 1 Jun 71, quoted in Pacific Stars and Stripes, 29 Aug 71.

### SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

We now have a basis for understanding the Soviets' referents when they think or speak of a military industrial complex. For them it is essentially an entire way of life encompassing the whole militarized Soviet society. How do they think of our military industrial complex? Candidate of Philosphic Sciences, Migolachev put it broadly as follows:

"Under modern conditions the interrelation and mutual penetration of military doctrine and political strategy of the US have become especially close; military force has become an inseparable attribute of the political course of the ruling circles of (the US)."<sup>25</sup>

The more detailed daily diatribes of Pravda and Izvestia deluge the Soviet citizen with anti American statements, which almost universally characterize the US as a MIC and describe the President as either the captive of the ruling military clique or its director.

### SOVIET ATTITUDES - MILITARY VIS A VIS PARTY

The connection between the party, the military and the MIC is quite straightforward based on the premise that the Party rules the country and that the Soviet Union is itself a MIC; the Communist Party leadership has made this very plain. General of the Army A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Fleet (the Soviet

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<sup>25</sup>Migolachev, "Aggressive Reality of the Politico-Military Strategy of American Imperialism", Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces) # 10, May 71

Air Force is considered part of the Army) said of the Party recently:

"The main source of strength of the Soviet Army and Fleet, the highest principle of military structure, has always been and remains the direction of the Communist Party. In the area of military development, in the matter of raising the defensive might of the country, there is no problem or question which does not receive the attention of the Communist Party and its military headquarters, the Central Committee of Lenin."<sup>26</sup>

General Yepishev not only heads a directorate of the Armed Forces, but he also reports directly to the Central Committee.<sup>27</sup>

The Soviet officers of the armed forces look forward to a lifetime of service in the armed forces. While on active duty an officer gets a higher salary than his counterpart in industry and there is no inducement whatsoever to look for a job or to cater to any industry representative in the hopes of having a job at retirement. Since all defense industries are already the property of the defense establishment and 'contracts' are awarded with no thought of competition there is little effort on the part of industrial representatives to curry favor with the service officers. No officer owns stock in any defense industry nor can he expect to make a profit from any type of contract with industry. Thus some of the real evils in the United States system are avoided,

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<sup>26</sup>A. Yepishev, "Untiring Concern of the Party", Izvestia,  
<sup>23</sup> Feb 71, p. 3.  
<sup>27</sup>DA Pam 550-95, Handbook, 581.



but the Soviet officer is continually told of these evils in the American system and is convinced that every American officer: is from the wealthy class, owns stock in some large corporation which he inherited, expects to work for a defense industry on retirement or to become a Congressman.<sup>28</sup>

#### SOVIETS AS NEGOTIATORS

In Helsinki, Vienna and Geneva we negotiate with three general types of people; the professional military, the professional Party members and the technicians. How do these three groups differ in their approach to the problem? The military as a group has been discussed previously.

The second type with whom we may expect to be negotiating is the professional party cadre. He is typically a well educated, self-seeking careerist. He was brought up in one of the larger cities of the USSR and was selected by the then Party leadership while he was in the university to join the Party. He retained his Party membership and worked at it enough to advance through his Party connections. He also probably believes that the American with whom he is negotiating is wealthy, owns stock in an armament industry and owes his livelihood to defense contracts. He probably has been out of

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<sup>28</sup>Interview with LTG P. A. Zhilin, Chief Historian, Ministry of Defense, USSR, Moscow, 18 May 71.

the USSR but resolutely closed his eyes to the good to be seen in capitalist countries and saw only the slums or the racial prejudice. He is the enemy, the source of the ugly stream of anti-American propaganda and the instigator of the war of liberation directed against the Free World. He, if any one, is the cynic at the table, planning to violate the agreement even before it is made.

The third type of negotiator is the scientist-technician. This is the man, who if he is a Party member, joined in self-defense or to get an education. He is extremely well qualified in his specialty and may well be qualified in two or three. He reads "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" and "Scientific American" in addition to several technical journals (in English) in one or more of his specialties. He also is at or near the top of the social ladder. If anyone at the table has his own dacha in the country, he does and his actual salary may be the highest in the group.<sup>29</sup> He has talked to many Americans, nearly all scientists, and has a supra national outlook on life and the world. He is convinced that American scientists want peace and that the oppressed people of the US also seek peace but that the MIC is pushing for war and that

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<sup>29</sup>DA Pam 550-95, Handbook, p. 373.

the Soviet armed forces are also pushing for war, but for different, more altruistic reasons. He believes that Americans are simple people enslaved by a callous system of monopolistic capital and if given the chance would rise up together with the Soviet people and rid the world of both systems.<sup>30</sup>

#### HOW WE DEAL WITH SOVIET ATTITUDES AND OUTLOOK

Dr. Ikle, in a recent monograph<sup>31</sup> listed five major shortcomings of the Americans negotiating with this group: excessive attention to ephemeral rhetoric, pettifoggery, succumbing to semantic infiltration, treating Soviet evaluations as immutable, and misjudging changes in our own values. To this list (which appears quite valid to me after five years of dealing with Soviets) should be added - failure to understand the difference in fundamental attitude toward values and vocabulary. Dr. Ikle warns against spending too much time analyzing the opponent's spoken word but I would warn against spending too little. Our problems come when significant negotiations are placed in the hands of expert military officers,

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<sup>31</sup>Fred C. Ikle, American Shortcomings in Negotiating with Communist Powers, Memorandum prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1970.

<sup>30</sup>Interview with Dr-Cosmonaut Egorov, Moscow, 9 May 70.

truck manufacturers or politicians who understand leadership, manufacturing, or people in an outstanding manner but have only a shallow grounding in Marxism-Leninism and even less understanding of the Soviet system.<sup>32</sup> As a result the 'experts' can not understand their Soviet counterpart even when the translation of the statement is dictionary perfect.

Even more important than an understanding of the words the Soviet negotiators use is an understanding of their view of us and the rest of the world. Their Marxist concept of our government is as a MIC, they sincerely negotiate with us on the basis that every move we make is conditioned by the profit motive and is controlled by monopolistic capital. One might argue that surely all the Soviets don't think that way, there must be some who understand the true facts. Unfortunately there is sufficient evidence that can be interpreted to prove their point of view that even the sincere ones can be convinced. There is little likelihood that one of our negotiators is going to change the mind of a dedicated Communist just as we do not expect our negotiators to have their minds changed in the course of talks on arms limitation. As Caldwell puts it -

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<sup>32</sup>Lawrence T. Caldwell, "Soviet Attitudes to SALT", Adelphi Papers # 75 (1971), p. 21.

"If the Soviet Union is accepted to be a functioning system with its own history, separate political culture and particular structures, it must be studied as much as possible on its own terms. This requires an effort to understand what the Soviets say about themselves and their policies."<sup>33</sup>

To understand Soviet negotiators requires a little study but the Soviet Union is one sixth of the earth's land surface and has the most powerful and best equipped armed forces on earth. Khrushchev said the Soviet Union will bury us - we would do well to analyze its plans to do it and make the necessary effort to understand so that we can use the knowledge to the advantage of the US in arms control negotiations.

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<sup>33</sup> Caldwell, p. 1.

*William P. DeLoach*

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